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Abstract
We prove a non-stochastic version of Le´vy’s zero-one law, and deduce several
corollaries from it, including non-stochastic versions of Kolmogorov’s zero-one
law, the ergodicity of Bernoulli shifts, and a zero-one law for dependent tri-
als. Our secondary goal is to explore the basic definitions of game-theoretic
probability theory, with Le´vy’s zero-one law serving a useful role.
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1 Introduction
In this article, we prove a game-theoretic version of Le´vy’s zero-one law. It
applies in situations where standard statements of Le´vy’s zero-one law ([8],
Section 41) do not apply, because we do not postulate a probability measure on
outcomes. This is typical for game-theoretic probability: see, e.g., [9]. Upper
and lower probabilities do emerge naturally in prediction protocols considered
in game-theoretic probability, but in many cases lower probabilities are strictly
less than the corresponding upper probabilities, and so they fall short of defining
a probability measure.
The investigation of zero-one laws of game-theoretic probability was started
in [10]. From our game-theoretic version of Le´vy’s zero-one law we deduce
game-theoretic versions of Kolmogorov’s zero-one law ([7], Appendix), the er-
godicity of Bernoulli shifts (see, e.g., [4], Section 8.1, Theorem 1), and Ba´rtfai
and Re´ve´sz’s [2] zero-one law. The first two results have been established in
[10], but our proofs are different: we obtain them as easy corollaries of our main
result.
We start our exposition in Section 2 by introducing our basic prediction
protocol and defining the game-theoretic notions of expectation and probability
(upper and lower); these definitions are explored in Section 3. In Section 4 we
prove Le´vy’s zero-one law for this protocol. In the second part of Section 4
we consider the special case of an event whose upper probability coincides with
its lower probability; our version of Le´vy’s zero-one law for such events looks
much more similar to the standard statement. Section 5 describes a useful
application of Le´vy’s zero-one law to the foundations of game-theoretic prob-
ability theory. In Section 6 we derive two other non-stochastic zero-one laws
(Kolmogorov’s zero-one law and the ergodicity of Bernoulli shifts) as corollar-
ies. In Section 7 we explain that our prediction protocol covers as special cases
seemingly more general protocols considered in literature. This helps us to de-
rive a non-stochastic version of one more zero-one law (Ba´rtfai and Re´ve´sz’s) in
Section 8.
We will be using the standard notation N = {1, 2, . . .} for the set of all
natural numbers and R = (−∞,∞) for the set of all real numbers. Alongside R
we will often consider sets, such as (−∞,∞] and R := [−∞,∞], obtained from
R by adding −∞ or ∞ (or both). We set 0 × ∞ := 0 and ∞ + (−∞) := ∞
(the operation + extended to R by ∞+ (−∞) :=∞ is denoted by .+ in [6]; in
this article we will omit the dot in
.
+ since we do not need any other extensions
of +). The indicator function of a subset E of a given set X will be denoted
IE ; i.e., IE : X → R takes the value 1 on E and the value 0 outside E. The
words such as “positive” and “negative” are to be understood in the wide sense
of inequalities ≥ and ≤ rather than > and <.
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2 Game-theoretic expectation and probability
We consider a perfect-information game between two players called World and
Skeptic. The game proceeds in discrete time. First we describe the game for-
mally, and then briefly explain the intuition behind the formal description.
Let X be a set, and let RX stand for the set of all functions f : X → R.
A function E : RX → R is called an outer probability content if it satisfies the
following four axioms:
1. If f, g ∈ RX satisfy f ≤ g, then E(f) ≤ E(g).
2. If f ∈ RX and c ∈ (0,∞), then E(cf) = cE(f).
3. If f, g ∈ RX , then E(f + g) ≤ E(f) + E(g).
4. For each c ∈ R, E(c) = c, where the c in parentheses is the function in RX
that is identically equal to c.
The function E is called a superexpectation functional (or superexpectation for
brevity) if, in addition, it satisfies the following axiom (sometimes referred to
as σ-subadditivity on [0,∞]X).
5. For any sequence of positive functions f1, f2, . . . in RX ,
E
( ∞∑
k=1
fk
)
≤
∞∑
k=1
E (fk) . (1)
Replacing the = in Axiom 2 with ≤ leads to an equivalent statement because,
for c ∈ (0,∞), E(cf) ≤ cE(f) = cE((1/c)cf) ≤ E(cf). In presence of Axiom 1,
we can allow c ∈ R in Axiom 4 without changing the content of the latter.
Axiom 4 implies E(0) = 0 (so that we can allow c = 0 in Axiom 2). This, in
combination with Axiom 1, implies
f ≥ 0 =⇒ E(f) ≥ 0. (2)
Axioms 3 and 4 imply that
E(f + c) = E(f) + c (3)
for each c ∈ R (indeed, E(f + c) ≤ E(f) + E(c) = E(f) + c and E(f) ≤ E(f +
c) + E(−c) = E(f + c)− c). From (2) and (3) we can see that, for any c ∈ R,
E(f) < c =⇒ inf
x∈X
f(x) < c. (4)
Axioms 1–5 are relaxations of the standard properties of the expectation
functional: cf., e.g., Axioms 1–5 in [12] (Axioms 2 and 3 are weaker than the
corresponding standard axioms, Axioms 1 and 4 are stronger than the corre-
sponding standard axioms but follow from standard Axioms 1–4, and Axiom 5
follows from standard Axiom 5 in the presence of our Axiom 3).
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The most controversial axiom is Axiom 5. It is satisfied in many interesting
cases, such as in the case of finite X and for many protocols in [9]. Axiom 5 is
convenient and often makes proofs easier. However, most of the results in this
article hold without it, as pointed out by a referee. For our principal results,
we first prove them assuming Axiom 5 but then give an additional argument to
get rid of the reliance on it.
The most noticeable difference between what we call superexpectation func-
tionals and the standard expectation functionals is that the former are defined
for all functions f : X → R whereas the latter are defined only for functions
that are measurable w.r. to a given σ-algebra. The notion of superexpectation
functional is more general since every expectation functional can be extended
to the whole of RX as the corresponding upper integral. Namely, E(f) can be
defined as the infimum of the expectation of g (taken to be ∞ whenever the
expectation of max(g, 0) is ∞) over all measurable functions g ≥ f . The exten-
sion may no longer be an expectation functional but is still a superexpectation
functional.
Remark. Superexpectation functionals have been studied in the past in many
different contexts under different names; in our terminology we mainly follow [6],
except that we abbreviate “outer probability content σ-subadditive on [0,∞]X”
to “superexpectation functional”. Upper previsions studied in the theory of
imprecise probabilities are closely related to superexpectation functionals, one
difference being that upper previsions are only defined on the bounded functions
in RX . There is a burgeoning literature, started by [1], on coherent measures
of risk, which are close to being mappings f 7→ E(−f), where E is an outer
probability content; coherent measures of risk, however, are usually defined
only for functions f that are measurable and do not take values ±∞.
Remark. It is sometimes useful to have the stronger form
f > 0 =⇒ E(f) > 0 (5)
of (2). Even the strong form (5) follows from Axioms 1–5. Indeed, if f > 0 but
E(f) = 0, Axioms 1–5 imply
1
4
= E (I{f>0}) = E (I∪∞n=1{nf≥1}) 1≤ E
( ∞∑
n=1
I{nf≥1}
)
5≤
∞∑
n=1
E (I{nf≥1}) 1≤ ∞∑
n=1
E(nf) 2= 0
(over each relation symbol we write the ordinal number of the axiom that jus-
tifies it; we could avoid using Axiom 2 by using (2) and Axiom 3 instead).
The main prediction protocol that we consider in this article is as follows.
Protocol 1. Basic prediction protocol
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Parameters: non-empty set X
and outer probability contents E1, E2, . . . on X
Protocol:
Skeptic announces K0 ∈ R.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Skeptic announces fn ∈ RX such that En(fn) ≤ Kn−1.
World announces xn ∈ X .
Kn := fn(xn).
END FOR
The set X will be called the outcome space; this set and the other parameters
of the game (namely, the outer probability contents E1, E2, . . . on X ) will be
fixed until Section 7. An important special case is where E1, E2, . . . are super-
expectations on X , but as we said, our principal results will not require this
assumption.
At the beginning of each trial n Skeptic chooses a gamble represented as
a function fn on X . After that World chooses the outcome xn of this trial,
which determines the payoff fn(xn) of Skeptic’s gamble. The gambles available
to Skeptic at trial n are determined by En. Skeptic’s capital after the nth trial
is denoted Kn. He is allowed to choose his initial capital K0 and, implicitly, also
allowed to throw away part of his capital at each trial. Our definitions imply
that Skeptic is allowed not to play at trial n (and thus keep his money intact)
by choosing fn ≡ Kn−1 (cf. Axiom 4). Property (4) reflects what is sometimes
called the “coherence” of the protocol; in its absence the protocol becomes a
money machine for Skeptic. (See also Lemma 1 below.) Protocol 1 covers the
apparently more general case where the superexpectations En are not fixed in
advance but chosen by a third player: see Section 7 below.
Remark. In [10] we considered a different but essentially equivalent predic-
tion protocol ([10], Protocol 2). For connections with Peter Walley’s theory of
imprecise probabilities, see the recent article [5].
Remark. An apparently more general version of Protocol 1 is where, at each
trial n, World chooses the outcome xn from a set Xn which may depend on n
and En is an outer probability content on Xn. However, this version immediately
reduces to our Protocol 1 by setting X := ⋃∞n=1 Xn and extending each En to
RX as E ′n(f) := En(f |Xn), f |Xn being the restriction of f to Xn.
We call the set Ω := X∞ of all infinite sequences of World’s moves the sample
space. The elements of the set X ∗ := ⋃∞n=0 Xn of all finite sequences of World’s
moves are called situations. For each situation s we let Γ(s) ⊆ Ω stand for the
set of all infinite extensions in Ω of s (i.e., Γ(s) is the set of all ω ∈ Ω such
that s is a prefix of ω). Let 2 be the empty situation. If s is a situation and
x ∈ X , sx is the situation obtained from s by adding x on the right; therefore,
sx = x1 . . . xnx when s = x1 . . . xn. If s and t are two situations, we write s ⊆ t
when s is a prefix of t, and we write s ⊂ t when s ⊆ t and s 6= t. We will also
be using derived notation such as s ⊆ u ⊆ t, s 6⊆ t, and s ⊇ t.
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The length |s| of a situation s ∈ Xn is n (i.e., |s| is the length of s as a finite
sequence); in particular, |2| = 0. If ω ∈ Ω and n ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, ωn is defined to
be the unique situation of length n that is a prefix of ω. For ω = x1x2 . . . ∈ Ω
and n ∈ N, we let ωn ∈ X stand for xn.
A strategy Σ for Skeptic is a pair (Σ0,Σ1), where Σ0 ∈ R (informally, this is
the initial capital chosen by Skeptic) and Σ1 : X ∗ → RX is a function satisfying
E1(Σ1(2)) ≤ Σ0 and En(Σ1(sx)) ≤ Σ1(s)(x) for all n ≥ 2, s ∈ Xn−2, and x ∈ X
(informally, for each situation s, Σ1(s) is the function chosen by Skeptic in
situation s). If we fix a strategy Σ = (Σ0,Σ1) for Skeptic, his capital Kn becomes
a function of the current situation s = x1 . . . xn of length n. We write KΣ(s)
for Kn resulting from Skeptic following Σ and from World playing s. Formally,
the function KΣ : X ∗ → R is defined by KΣ(2) := Σ0 and KΣ(sx) := Σ1(s)(x)
for all s ∈ X ∗ and all x ∈ X . This function will be called the capital process of
Σ. A function S is called a (game-theoretic) supermartingale if it is the capital
process, S = KΣ, of some strategy Σ for Skeptic.
Notice that a function S is a supermartingale if and only if S : X ∗ → R and,
for all n ∈ N and all situations s ∈ Xn−1 of length n− 1,
En (S(s ·)) ≤ S(s),
where, as usual, S(s ·) : X → R is the function mapping each x ∈ X to S(sx).
A supermartingale S is a martingale if En(S(s ·)) = S(s) for all n ∈ N and
s ∈ Xn−1.
Remark. Martingales are less useful for us than supermartingales since the
sum of two martingales may fail to be a martingale (the inequality in Axiom 3
may be strict), whereas the sum of two supermartingales is always a super-
martingale. Under Axiom 5, even a countable sum of positive supermartingales
is a supermartingale.
The following useful property of supermartingales follows easily from (4).
Lemma 1. For each supermartingale S and each situation s,
S(s) ≥ inf
ω∈Γ(s)
S(ω),
where S(ω) is defined to be lim supn→∞ S(ωn) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. Let s = x1 . . . xk ∈ X k and let r > S(s) be given. Since Ek+1(S(s ·)) ≤
S(s) < r, by (4) there exists xk+1 ∈ X such that S(x1 . . . xk+1) < r. Repeating
the argument we can find xk+1xk+2 . . . such that S(x1 . . . xn) < r for all n ≥ k.
Setting ω := x1x2 . . ., we have ω ∈ Γ(s) and S(ωn) < r for all n ≥ k. This
completes the proof.
For each function ξ : Ω→ R and each situation s, we define the (conditional)
upper expectation of ξ given s by
E(ξ | s) := inf
{
a
∣∣ ∃S : S(s) = a and
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lim inf
n→∞ S(ω
n) ≥ ξ(ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s)
}
(6)
where S ranges over the supermartingales that are bounded below, and we define
the lower expectation of ξ given s by
E(ξ | s) := −E (−ξ | s) . (7)
If E is any subset of Ω, its upper and lower probability given a situation s are
defined by
P(E | s) := E(IE | s), P(E | s) := E(IE | s), (8)
respectively. In what follows we sometimes refer to sets E ⊆ Ω as events.
Lemma 2. For each situation s, E(· | s) : RΩ → R is an outer probability
content.
Proof. It is evident that Axiom 1 is satisfied for E(· | s). Axiom 3 for E(· | s)
follows from the fact that, by Axiom 3 applied to E1, E2, . . ., the sum U := S+T
of two bounded below supermartingales S and T is again a bounded below
supermartingale and that it satisfies
lim inf
n→∞ S(ω
n) + lim inf
n→∞ T (ω
n) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ U(ω
n)
for all ω ∈ Γ(s). In the same manner, we can use Axiom 2 applied to E1, E2, . . .
to deduce that E(· | s) satisfies Axiom 2. Let c ∈ R. Since the function on
RX that is identically equal to c is a supermartingale, E(c | s) ≤ c. Let S
be a bounded below supermartingale satisfying lim infn→∞ S(ωn) ≥ c for all
ω ∈ Γ(s). By Lemma 1, we then have S(s) ≥ c. Therefore, E(c | s) ≥ c, which
completes the proof of Axiom 4 for E(· | s).
Lemma 2 immediately implies the following statement (cf. [6], (5.4)).
Corollary 1. For all situations s and all functions ξ : Ω→ R, E(ξ | s) ≤ E(ξ |
s). In particular, P(E | s) ≤ P(E | s) for all events E ⊆ Ω.
Proof. Suppose E(ξ | s) > E(ξ | s), i.e., E(ξ | s) + E(−ξ | s) < 0. By Axiom 3
applied to E(· | s) this implies E(0 | s) < 0, which contradicts Axiom 4 for
E(· | s).
Important special cases are where s = 2 (unconditional upper and lower
expectations and probabilities). We set E(ξ) := E(ξ | 2), E(ξ) := E(ξ | 2),
P(E) := P(E | 2), and P(E) := P(E | 2). We say that an event E is almost
certain, or happens almost surely (a.s.), if P(E) = 1; in this case we will also
say that E, considered as a property of ω ∈ Ω, holds for almost all ω. More
generally, we say that E holds almost surely on B (or for almost all ω ∈ B), for
another event B, if the event (B ⇒ E) := (Bc ∪E) is almost certain. An event
E is almost impossible, or null, if P(E) = 0.
In [9] we defined the lower probability of an event E as 1 − P(Ec). The
following lemma says that this definition is equivalent to our current definition.
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Lemma 3. For each event E ⊆ Ω and each situation s,
P(E | s) = 1− P(Ec | s).
Proof. By (3) and Lemma 2, we have E(ξ+c | s) = E(ξ | s)+c for all ξ : Ω→ R
and c ∈ R. Therefore,
P(E | s) = E(IE | s) = −E(− IE | s)
= 1− E(1− IE | s) = 1− E(IEc | s) = 1− P(Ec | s).
The following lemma will be used in the proof of Lemma 5 stating that
upper expectation is a superexpectation functional in the case where E1, E2, . . .
are superexpectation functionals.
Lemma 4. The right-hand side of (6) will not change when Γ(s) is replaced
by Ω.
Proof. It suffices to prove that if a bounded below supermartingale S satis-
fies S(s) < r and lim infn→∞ S(ωn) ≥ ξ(ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s), then there ex-
ists another bounded below supermartingale S ′ that satisfies S ′(s) < r and
lim infn→∞ S ′(ωn) ≥ ξ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Such an S ′ can be defined by
S ′(t) :=
{
S(t) if s ⊆ t
∞ otherwise.
Lemma 5. Suppose E1, E2, . . . are superexpectations, and let s be a situation.
Then E(· | s) is also a superexpectation. In particular, for any sequence of events
E1, E2, . . ., it is true that
P
( ∞⋃
k=1
Ek
)
≤
∞∑
k=1
P (Ek) .
In particular, the union of a sequence of null events is null.
Proof. In view of Lemma 2, our goal is to prove
E
( ∞∑
k=1
ξk
∣∣∣ s) ≤ ∞∑
k=1
E (ξk | s) ,
where ξ1, ξ2, . . . are positive functions in RΩ. Let  > 0 be arbitrarily small. For
each k ∈ N choose a supermartingale Sk (automatically positive, by Lemma 1)
such that lim infn Sk(ωn) ≥ ξk(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω (cf. Lemma 4) and Sk(s) ≤
E(ξk | s) + /2k. Since all En are superexpectations, the sum S :=
∑∞
k=1 Sk
will be a supermartingale (cf. (1)); this supermartingale will satisfy S(s) ≤∑∞
k=1 E(ξk | s) +  and, by Fatou’s lemma,
lim inf
n
S(ωn) = lim inf
n
∞∑
k=1
Sk(ωn) ≥
∞∑
k=1
lim inf
n
Sk(ωn) ≥
∞∑
k=1
ξk(ω)
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for all ω ∈ Ω. Therefore,
E
( ∞∑
k=1
ξk
∣∣∣ s) ≤ S(s) ≤ ∞∑
k=1
E (ξk | s) + .
It remains to remember that  can be taken arbitrarily small.
3 Equivalent definitions of game-theoretic ex-
pectation and probability
The following proposition, which is our main statement of equivalence, gives
two equivalent definitions of upper game-theoretic expectation.
Theorem 1. For all ξ : Ω→ R and all situations s,
E(ξ | s) = inf
{
S(s) ∣∣ lim sup
n→∞
S(ωn) ≥ ξ(ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s)
}
(i.e., on the right-hand side of (6), we can replace lim inf by lim sup), where S
ranges over the supermartingales that are bounded below, and
E(ξ | s) = inf
{
S(s) ∣∣ ∀ω ∈ Γ(s) : lim
n→∞S(ω
n) ≥ ξ(ω)
}
where S ranges over the class L of all bounded below supermartingales for which
limn→∞ S(ωn) exists in (−∞,∞] for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. Let a bounded below supermartingale S satisfy the inequality
∀ω ∈ Γ(s0) : lim sup
n→∞
S(ωn) ≥ ξ(ω)
(cf. (6)) and let  ∈ (0, 1). It suffices to show that there exists S∗ ∈ L such that
S∗(s0) ≤ S(s0) +  and ∀ω ∈ Γ(s0) : lim
n→∞S
∗(ωn) ≥ ξ(ω). (9)
Without loss of generality we assume S(s0) <∞ (if S(s0) =∞, set S∗(s) :=∞
for all s). Setting S ′ := (S−C)/(S(s0)−C), where C is any constant satisfying
C < inf S, we obtain a positive supermartingale satisfying S ′(s0) = 1.
The idea is now to use the standard proof of Doob’s convergence theorem
(see, e.g., [9], Lemma 4.5). But first we need to give more definitions, which
will also be used in the proof of Theorem 2.
If s and t are two situations such that s ⊆ t, we define the “intervals”
[s, t] := {u | s ⊆ u ⊆ t}, [s, t) := {u | s ⊆ u ⊂ t},
(s, t] := {u | s ⊂ u ⊆ t}, (s, t) := {u | s ⊂ u ⊂ t}.
Two situations s and t are said to be comparable if s ⊆ t or t ⊆ s; otherwise they
are incomparable. A cut is a set of situations that are pairwise incomparable
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(cuts are analogous to stopping times in measure-theoretic probability). If σ
and τ are two cuts, we write σ ≤ τ to mean ∀t ∈ τ ∃s ∈ σ : s ⊆ t, and we write
σ < τ to mean ∀t ∈ τ ∃s ∈ σ : s ⊂ t. In the case σ ≤ τ , we define the “time
intervals”
[σ, τ ] := {u | [2, u] ∩ σ 6= ∅, [2, u) ∩ τ = ∅},
[σ, τ) := {u | [2, u] ∩ σ 6= ∅, [2, u] ∩ τ = ∅},
(σ, τ ] := {u | [2, u) ∩ σ 6= ∅, [2, u) ∩ τ = ∅},
(σ, τ) := {u | [2, u) ∩ σ 6= ∅, [2, u] ∩ τ = ∅}.
Notice that for all stopping times σ, τ, ρ such that σ ≤ τ ≤ ρ,
[σ, τ) ∩ [τ, ρ) = ∅ and [σ, τ) ∪ [τ, ρ) = [σ, ρ).
If s is a situation and τ is a cut, sτ stands for the unique (when it exists)
situation t ∈ τ such that t ⊆ s. Similarly, if ω ∈ Ω and τ is a cut, ωτ stands for
the unique (when it exists) situation t ∈ τ that is a prefix of ω. (The case where
ωτ does not exist is analogous to the case where a stopping time takes value ∞
in measure-theoretic probability.) Notice that our notation ωn for n = 0, 1, . . .
can be regarded as a special case of the new notation: we can interpret the
upper index n as the cut consisting of all situations of length n. We will also
be using the notation sn, where n = 0, 1, . . . and s is a situation, in the same
sense.
Let [ai, bi], i = 1, 2, . . ., be an enumeration of all intervals with 0 ≤ ai <
bi < ∞ and both end-points rational. For each i one can define a positive
supermartingale Si with Si(s0) = 1 such that Si(ωn) converges to∞ as n→∞
when lim infn S ′(ωn) < ai and lim supn S ′(ωn) > bi. The construction of Si
is standard. First we define two sequences of cuts τ i0, τ
i
1, . . . and σ
i
1, σ
i
2, . . . by
setting τ i0 := {s0} and, for k = 1, 2, . . .,
σik := {s | S ′(s) > bi,∃t ⊂ s : t ∈ τ ik−1,∀u ∈ (t, s) : S ′(u) ≤ bi},
τ ik := {s | S ′(s) < ai,∃t ⊂ s : t ∈ σik,∀u ∈ (t, s) : S ′(u) ≥ ai}.
Now we define Si by the requirement that, for all situations s ⊇ s0 and all
x ∈ X ,
Si(sx) :=
{
Si(s) + S ′(sx)− S ′(s) if Si(s) <∞ and ∃k : s ∈ [τ ik−1, σik)
Si(s) otherwise; (10)
in conjunction with Si(s0) = 1 this determines Si uniquely on the situations
s ⊇ s0. If s 6⊇ s0, set Si(s) := ∞. We have En(Si(s ·)) ≤ Si(s), where
n := |s|+ 1, in both cases considered in (10); e.g., since S ′ is a supermartingale,
En(Si(s ·)) = En(Si(s) + S ′(s ·)− S ′(s)) ≤ Si(s)
when Si(s) <∞ and ∃k : s ∈ [τ ik−1, σik).
Let us check that each supermartingale Si is positive. There are three (over-
lapping) cases:
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• If s ∈ [τ i0, σi1],
Si(s) ≥ S ′(s) ≥ 0
(we write Si(s) ≥ S ′(s) rather than Si(s) = S ′(s) because of the possibil-
ity that S ′(s) <∞ but S ′(t) =∞ for some t ⊂ s).
• If s ∈ [σik, τ ik] for some k = 1, 2, . . .,
Si(s) ≥ 1 +
(
S ′(sσi1)− S ′(s0)
)
+
(
S ′(sσi2)− S ′(sτ i1)
)
+ · · ·+
(
S ′(sσik)− S ′(sτ ik−1)
)
≥ bi + (k − 1)(bi − ai) ≥ 0. (11)
• If s ∈ [τ ik, σik+1] for some k = 1, 2, . . .,
Si(s) ≥ 1 +
(
S ′(sσi1)− S ′(s0)
)
+
(
S ′(sσi2)− S ′(sτ i1)
)
+ · · ·+
(
S ′(sσik)− S ′(sτ ik−1)
)
+
(
S ′(s)− S ′(sτ ik)
)
≥ bi + (k − 1)(bi − ai) + S ′(s)− ai ≥ k(bi − ai) ≥ 0. (12)
Equations (11) and (12) also show that Si(ωn) indeed converges to∞ as n→∞
whenever lim infn S ′(ωn) < ai and lim supn S ′(ωn) > bi for ω ∈ Γ(s0).
Now we can set
T :=
∞∑
i=1
2−iSi (13)
and S∗ := S + T . Assume, for a moment, that E1, E2, . . . are superexpecta-
tions. In this case T , being a countable sum of positive supermartingales, is a
positive supermartingale itself. Being a sum of two supermartingales, S∗ is a
supermartingale itself.
Let us check that S∗ ∈ L; this will imply the second inequality in (9) (the
first inequality holds by the definition of S∗). Since S∗ is bounded below, we
are only required to check that S∗(ωn) converges in (−∞,∞] as n→∞ for all
ω ∈ Ω. Fix ω ∈ Ω.
If S(ωn) =∞ for some n, there exists i such that Si(ωn) =∞ from some n
on (take any i such that ai = 0 and bi > maxk<n S ′(ωk), where n is the smallest
number such that S(ωn) = ∞), and so we have T (ωn) = ∞ and S∗(ωn) = ∞
from some n on. Therefore, we will assume that S(ωn) <∞ for all n.
If S(ωn) converges to ∞, S∗(ωn) also converges to ∞. If S(ωn) (and, there-
fore, S ′(ωn)) does not converge in (−∞,∞], there exists i such that Si(ωn)→∞
(take any i satisfying lim infn S ′(ωn) < ai < bi < lim supn S ′(ωn)), and so we
have T (ωn) → ∞ and S∗(ωn) → ∞. It remains to consider the case where
S(ωn) converges in R.
Suppose S(ωn) and, therefore, S ′(ωn) converge in R but S∗(ωn) does not
converge in (−∞,∞]. Choose a non-empty interval (a, b) ⊆ R such that
lim infn S∗(ωn) < a < b < lim supn S∗(ωn) and set c := b− a. Take any N ∈ N
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such that S∗(ωN ) > b and |S(ωn)−S(ωm)| < c/2, |S ′(ωn)−S ′(ωm)| < c/4 for
all n,m ≥ N . Since S ′(ωn)− S ′(ωm) > −c/4 for all n,m ≥ N , we will have
Si(ωn)− Si(ωN ) > −c/2 (14)
for all i and all n ≥ N . Indeed, there are five cases (overlapping):
• If ωN ∈ [σil , τ il ] for some l = 1, 2, . . . and ωn ∈ [σik, τ ik] for some k =
l, l + 1, . . .:
Si(ωn)− Si(ωN ) =
(
S ′(ωσil+1)− S ′(ωτ il )
)
+
(
S ′(ωσil+2)− S ′(ωτ il+1)
)
+ · · ·+
(
S ′(ωσik)− S ′(ωτ ik−1)
)
≥ (k − l)(bi − ai) ≥ 0.
• If ωN ∈ [σil , τ il ] for some l = 1, 2, . . . and ωn ∈ [τ ik, σik+1] for some k =
l, l + 1, . . .:
Si(ωn)− Si(ωN ) =
(
S ′(ωσil+1)− S ′(ωτ il )
)
+
(
S ′(ωσil+2)− S ′(ωτ il+1)
)
+ · · ·+
(
S ′(ωσik)− S ′(ωτ ik−1)
)
+
(
S ′(ωn)− S ′(ωτ ik)
)
> (k − l)(bi − ai)− c/4 ≥ −c/4.
• If ωN ∈ [τ il−1, σil ] for some l = 1, 2, . . . and ωn ∈ [σik, τ ik] for some k =
l, l + 1, . . .:
Si(ωn)− Si(ωN ) =
(
S ′(ωσil )− S ′(ωN )
)
+
(
S ′(ωσil+1)− S ′(ωτ il )
)
+(
S ′(ωσil+2)− S ′(ωτ il+1)
)
+ · · ·+
(
S ′(ωσik)− S ′(ωτ ik−1)
)
> −c/4 + (k − l)(bi − ai) ≥ −c/4.
• If ωN ∈ [τ il−1, σil ] for some l = 1, 2, . . . and ωn ∈ [τ ik, σik+1] for some
k = l, l + 1, . . .:
Si(ωn)− Si(ωN ) =
(
S ′(ωσil )− S ′(ωN )
)
+
(
S ′(ωσil+1)− S ′(ωτ il )
)
+
(
S ′(ωσil+2)− S ′(ωτ il+1)
)
+ · · ·+
(
S ′(ωσik)− S ′(ωτ ik−1)
)
+
(
S ′(ωn)− S ′(ωτ ik)
)
> −c/4 + (k − l)(bi − ai)− c/4 ≥ −c/2.
• If ωN , ωn ∈ [τ il−1, σil ] for some l = 1, 2, . . .:
Si(ωn)− Si(ωN ) = S ′(ωn)− S ′(ωN ) > −c/4.
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In all five cases we have (14). This implies T (ωn) − T (ωN ) > −c/2, and so
S∗(ωn) − S∗(ωN ) > −c for all n ≥ N (remember that  < 1). The latter
contradicts the fact that S∗(ωn) − S∗(ωN ) < −c for some n ≥ N (namely, for
any n ≥ N satisfying S∗(ωn) < a).
This completes the proof in the case where E1, E2, . . . are superexpectations.
However, we do not really need Axiom 5: despite the appearance of an infinite
sum in (13), for each situation s and each x ∈ X the increment T (sx) − T (s)
of T can be represented (assuming T (s) <∞) as
T (sx)− T (s) =
∞∑
i=1
2−i(Si(sx)− Si(s)) =
( ∞∑
i=1
wi
)
(S ′(sx)− S ′(s)),
where wi ∈ {0, 2−i} (this makes the series
∑∞
i=1 wi convergent in R) are defined
by
wi :=
{
2−i if ∃k : s ∈ [τ ik−1, σik)
0 otherwise.
Since S ′ is a supermartingale, E|s|+1(T (s ·) − T (s)) ≤ 0. This argument for T
being a supermartingale does not depend on Axiom 5.
Replacing the lim infn→∞ in (6) by infn or supn does change the definition.
If we replace the lim infn→∞ by infn, we will have E(ξ | s) = supω∈Γ(s) ξ(ω). In
the following example we consider replacing lim infn→∞ by supn.
Example 1. Set
E1(ξ) := inf
{
S(2)
∣∣∣ ∀ω ∈ Ω : sup
n
S(ωn) ≥ ξ(ω)
}
,
S ranging over the bounded below supermartingales. It is always true that
E1(ξ) ≤ E(ξ). Consider the coin-tossing protocol ([9], Section 8.2), which is the
special case of Protocol 1 with X = {0, 1} and En(f) = (f(0) + f(1))/2 for all
n ∈ N and f ∈ RX . For each  ∈ (0, 1] there exists a bounded positive function
ξ on Ω such that E(ξ) = 1 and E1(ξ) = .
Proof. Let us demonstrate the following equivalent statement: for any C ≥ 1
there exists a bounded positive function ξ such that E1(ξ) = 1 and E(ξ) = C.
Fix such a C. Define Ξ : Ω→ [0,∞] by the requirement Ξ(ω) := 2n where n is
the number of 1s at the beginning of ω: n := max{i | ω1 = · · · = ωi = 1}. It is
obvious that E1(Ξ) = 1 and E(Ξ) = ∞. However, Ξ is unbounded. We can al-
ways find A ≥ 1 such that E(min(Ξ, A)) = C (as the function a 7→ E(min(Ξ, a))
is continuous). Since E1(min(Ξ, A)) = 1, we can set ξ := min(Ξ, A).
Game-theoretic probability is a special case of game-theoretic expecta-
tion, and in this special case it is possible to replace lim infn→∞ not only by
lim supn→∞ but also by supn, provided we restrict our attention to positive su-
permartingales (simple examples show that this qualification is necessary). By
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Lemma 4, the definition of conditional upper probability P can be rewritten as
P(E | s) := inf
{
S(s) ∣∣ lim inf
n→∞ S(ω
n) ≥ 1 for all ω ∈ E ∩ Γ(s)
}
, (15)
S ranging over the positive supermartingales.
Lemma 6. The definition of upper probability will not change if we replace the
lim infn→∞ in (15) by lim supn→∞ or by supn.
It is obvious that the definition will change if we replace the lim infn→∞ by infn:
in this case we will have
P(E | s) =
{
0 if E ∩ Γ(s) = ∅
1 otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 6. It suffices to prove that the definition will not change if
we replace the lim infn→∞ in (15) by supn. Consider a strategy for Skeptic
resulting in a positive capital process. If this strategy ensures supnKn > 1 when
x1x2 . . . ∈ E ∩Γ(s) (it is obvious that it does not matter whether we have ≥ or
> in (15)), Skeptic can also ensure lim infn→∞Kn > 1 when x1x2 . . . ∈ E∩Γ(s)
by stopping (i.e., always choosing fn identically equal to his current capital)
after his capital Kn exceeds 1.
Remark. The basic notion of this article is that of a bounded below super-
martingale; in particular, upper and lower expectation and probability are
defined in terms of bounded below supermartingales. To define the latter it
would be sufficient to start, instead of outer probability contents, from func-
tionals F that satisfy Axioms 1–4 and whose domain consists of the functions
in RX that are bounded from below. To see that no generality is lost when
one starts from outer probability contents, it is sufficient to check that any such
F can be extended to an outer probability content. One possible extension is
E(f) := lima→−∞ F(max(f, a)). Axioms 1–4 are easy to check for E ; e.g., Ax-
iom 3 follows from the inequality max(f + g, 2a) ≤ max(f, a) + max(g, a) and
Axiom 3 for F :
E(f + g) = lim
a→−∞F(max(f + g, a)) = lima→−∞F(max(f + g, 2a))
≤ lim
a→−∞F(max(f, a) + max(g, a)) ≤ lima→−∞ (F(max(f, a)) + F(max(g, a)))
= lim
a→−∞F(max(f, a)) + lima→−∞F(max(g, a)) = E(f) + E(g).
It is also easy to check that E will be a superexpectation functional whenever
F is a superexpectation functional.
4 Le´vy’s zero-one law
The following simple theorem is our main result.
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Theorem 2. Let ξ : Ω → (−∞,∞] be bounded from below. For almost all
ω ∈ Ω,
lim inf
n→∞ E(ξ | ω
n) ≥ ξ(ω). (16)
This theorem is a game-theoretic version of Le´vy’s zero-one law. Its name
derives from its well-known connections with various zero-one phenomena, some
of which will be explored in the next section and Section 8.
Proof of Theorem 2. This proof will be similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in
that it will be based on the idea used in the standard proof of Doob’s martin-
gale convergence theorem. However, this idea will be applied in a less familiar
mode (“multiplicative” rather than “additive”), and so before giving a detailed
proof we explain the intuition behind it making the simplifying assumption that
E1, E2, . . . are superexpectations.
By Lemma 6, it suffices to construct a positive supermartingale starting
from 1 that is unbounded on ω ∈ Ω for which (16) is not true. (We say that a
supermartingale is unbounded on a sequence ω if it is unbounded on its prefixes
ωn as n → ∞.) Without loss of generality we will assume ξ to be positive (we
can always redefine ξ := ξ − inf ξ). According to Lemma 5 (last statement), we
can, without loss of generality, replace “for which (16) is not true” by
lim inf
n→∞ E(ξ | ω
n) < a < b < ξ(ω) (17)
where a and b are given positive rational numbers such that a < b. The su-
permartingale is defined as the capital process of the following strategy for
Skeptic. Let ω ∈ Ω be the sequence of moves chosen by World. Start with 1
monetary unit. Wait until E(ξ | ωn) < a (if this never happens, do nothing,
i.e., always choose constant fn ≡ Kn−1). As soon as this happens, choose a
positive supermartingale S1 starting from a, S1(ωn) = a, whose upper limit
ψ ∈ Ω 7→ lim supm→∞ S1(ψm) exceeds ξ on Γ(ωn). Maintain capital S1/a until
S1 reaches a value m1 > b (at which point Skeptic’s capital is m1/a > b/a).
After that do nothing until E(ξ | ωn) < a. As soon as this happens, choose
a positive supermartingale S2 starting from a, S2(ωn) = a, whose upper limit
exceeds ξ on Γ(ωn). Maintain capital (m1/a
2)S2 until S2 reaches a value m2 > b
(at which point Skeptic’s capital is m1m2/a
2 > (b/a)2). After that do nothing
until E(ξ | ωn) < a. As soon as this happens, choose a positive supermartingale
S3 starting from a whose upper limit exceeds ξ on Γ(ωn). Maintain capital
(m1m2/a
3)S3 until S3 reaches a value m3 > b (at which point Skeptic’s capital
is m1m2m3/a
3 > (b/a)3). And so on. On the event (17) Skeptic’s capital will
be unbounded.
We start the formal proof by setting ξ′ := ξ − C, where C is any constant
satisfying C < inf ξ. Let [ai, bi], i = 1, 2, . . ., be an enumeration of all intervals
with 0 ≤ ai < bi < ∞ and both end-points rational. For each i we will define
a positive supermartingale Si with Si(2) = 1 such that Si(ωn) converges to ∞
as n→∞ when
lim inf
n→∞ E(ξ
′ | ωn) < ai < bi < ξ′(ω) (18)
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(cf. (17)). First we define two sequences of cuts σi0, σ
i
1, σ
i
2, . . . and τ
i
1, τ
i
2, . . . and
a family of supermartingales Ss, s ∈ ∪∞k=1τ ik (the dependence of Ss on i is not
indicated explicitly but should always be borne in mind). Set σi0 := {2}. For
k = 1, 2, . . ., set
τ ik := {s | E(ξ′ | s) < ai,∃t ⊂ s : t ∈ σik−1,∀u ∈ (t, s) : E(ξ′ | u) ≥ ai},
choose for each s ∈ τ ik a positive supermartingale Ss satisfying Ss(s) < ai and,
for all ω ∈ Γ(s), lim infn Ss(ωn) ≥ ξ′(ω), and set
σik := {s | ∃t ⊂ s : t ∈ τ ik,St(s) > bi,∀u ∈ (t, s) : St(u) ≤ bi}.
This definition is inductive: the two cuts and the family of supermartingales
are defined in the indicated order: first σi0, then τ
i
1, then Ss for s ∈ τ i1, then
σi1, then τ
i
2, then Ss for s ∈ τ i2, then σi2, etc. Now we define Si inductively. Set
Si(2) := 1. For all situations s and all x ∈ X , define Si(sx) via Si(s) as follows:
• First suppose that Si(s) < ∞ and, for some k ∈ N, s ∈ [τ ik, σik). Let k
be the unique value satisfying s ∈ [τ ik, σik). Set t := sτ
i
k and Si(sx) :=
Si(s)St(sx)/St(s) (notice that, by induction, Si(s) < ∞ implies St(s) <
∞).
• Otherwise, set Si(sx) := Si(s).
Since each Ss is a supermartingale (strictly positive, by Lemma 1), Axiom 2
shows that Si is also a supermartingale. It is positive by construction.
Let us check that each supermartingale Si satisfies lim supn Si(ωn) =∞ for
ω ∈ Ω satisfying (18). For all k ∈ N and all ω satisfying (18), ωσik exists and
satisfies
Si(ωσik) =
S
ωτ
i
1
(ωσ
i
1)
S
ωτ
i
1
(ωτ
i
1)
S
ωτ
i
2
(ωσ
i
2)
S
ωτ
i
2
(ωτ
i
2)
· · ·
S
ωτ
i
k
(ωσ
i
k)
S
ωτ
i
k
(ωτ
i
k)
≥ (bi/ai)k →∞ (19)
as k →∞. Setting
T :=
∞∑
i=1
2−iSi
and assuming that E1, E2, . . . are superexpectations, we obtain a positive super-
martingale T with T (2) = 1 that is unbounded on the complement of (16). Ap-
plication of Lemma 6 completes the proof under the assumption that E1, E2, . . .
are superexpectations.
It remains to get rid of the assumption. To this end we modify the definition
of the supermartingales Ss: now in each situation s ∈ X ∗ such that E(ξ′ | s) <∞
we fix a strictly positive supermartingale Ss such that Ss(s) < E(ξ′ | s) + 2−|s|
and, for all ω ∈ Γ(s), lim infn Ss(ωn) ≥ ξ′(ω). This definition does not depend
on i anymore. Using the new definition of Ss, define stopping times σik, τ ik,
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supermartingales Si, and a function T as before; remember that in the definition
of Si, Si(sx) :=∞ whenever Si(s) =∞. For each i ∈ N set
Ai :=
{
s ∈ X ∗ | Si(s) <∞,∃k ∈ N : s ∈ [τ ik, σik)
}
(this is the set of situations in which Si is “active”), and for each s ∈ Ai set
T (s, i) := sτ
i
k , where k satisfies s ∈ [τ ik, σik) (there is only one such k).
Fix an arbitrary situation s ∈ Xn−1, for some n ∈ N; our next goal is to
prove En(T (s ·)) ≤ T (s). Without loss of generality, assume T (s) <∞. Setting,
for t ⊆ s,
wt :=
∑
i∈N:s∈Ai,T (s,i)=t
2−iSi(s) ∈ [0,∞],
we have
T (sx) =
∞∑
i=1
2−iSi(sx) =
∑
i:s∈Ai
2−iSi(s)ST (s,i)(sx)ST (s,i)(s) +
∑
i:s/∈Ai
2−iSi(s)
=
∑
t⊆s
wt
St(sx)
St(s) +
∑
i:s/∈Ai
2−iSi(s)
(the denominators ST (s,i)(s) and St(s) are finite because of our assumption
T (s) <∞), which implies, since the sum ∑t⊆s is finite (namely, contains |s|+1
addends),
En(T (s ·)) =
∑
t⊆s
wt
En(St(s ·))
St(s) +
∑
i:s/∈Ai
2−iSi(s)
≤
∑
t⊆s
wt
St(s)
St(s) +
∑
i:s/∈Ai
2−iSi(s) = T (s).
Therefore, T is a supermartingale.
Notice that (19) will still hold for ω satisfying (18) if we replace (bi/ai)
k by
k∏
j=1
bi
ai + 2−|ω
τi
j |
; (20)
since |ωτ ij | → ∞ as j → ∞, the product (20) still tends to ∞ as k → ∞.
Therefore, T is unbounded on the complement of (16).
In the rest of the article we will derive a series of corollaries from Theorem 2.
First of all, specializing Theorem 2 to the indicators of events, we obtain:
Corollary 2. Let E be any event. For almost all ω ∈ E,
P(E | ωn)→ 1
as n→∞.
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It is easy to check that we cannot replace the ≥ in (16) by =, even when ξ
is the indicator of an event. For example, suppose that X = {0, 1} and each En
is the sup functional: En(f) := supx∈X f(x) for all n ∈ N and f ∈ RX . If E
consists of binary sequences containing only finitely many 1s, P(E | ωn) = 1 for
all ω and n; therefore,
lim inf
n→∞ P(E | ω
n) 6= IE(ω)
for all ω ∈ Ec, and P(Ec) = 1.
The case of a determinate expectation or probability
In Section 41 of [8] (pp. 128–130), Le´vy states his zero-one law in terms of a
property E that a sequence X1, X2, . . . of random variables might or might
not have. He writes Pr.{E} for the initial probability of E, and Prn{E} for
its probability after X1, . . . , Xn is known. He remarks that if Pr.{E} is well
defined (i.e., if E is measurable), then the conditional probabilities Prn{E} are
also well defined. Then he states the law as follows (our translation from the
French):
Except in cases that have probability zero, if Pr.{E} is deter-
mined, then Prn{E} tends, as n tends to infinity, to one if the se-
quence X1, X2, . . . verifies the property E, and to zero in the con-
trary case.
In this subsection we will derive a game-theoretic result that resembles Le´vy’s
statement of his result. We will be concerned with functions ξ satisfying E(ξ) =
E(ξ) and events E satisfying P(E) = P(E).
Lemma 7. Suppose E1, E2, . . . are superexpectations. Let a function ξ : Ω→ R
satisfy E(ξ) = E(ξ) ∈ R. Then it is almost certain that it also satisfies E(ξ |
ωn) = E(ξ | ωn) for all n.
Proof. For any strictly positive , there exist bounded below supermartingales
S1 and S2 such that
S1(2) < E(ξ) + /2, S2(2) < E(−ξ) + /2
and, for all ω ∈ Ω,
lim inf
n→∞ S1(ω
n) ≥ ξ(ω), lim inf
n→∞ S2(ω
n) ≥ −ξ(ω).
Set S := S1 + S2. The assumption E(ξ) = E(ξ) ∈ R can also be writ-
ten E(ξ) + E(−ξ) = 0. So the supermartingale S satisfies S(2) <  and
lim infn→∞ S(ωn) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω; by Lemma 1, the supermartingale S is
positive.
Fix n and δ > 0, and let E be the event that
E(ξ | ωn) + E(−ξ | ωn) > δ.
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By the definition of conditional upper expectation,
S1(ωn) ≥ E(ξ | ωn) and S2(ωn) ≥ E(−ξ | ωn).
So S(ωn) > δ for all ω ∈ E. So, by Lemma 6, the upper probability of E is
less than /δ. Since  may be as small as we like for fixed δ, this shows that E
has upper probability zero. Letting δ range over the strictly positive rational
numbers and n over {0, 1, 2, . . .} and applying the last part of Lemma 5, we
obtain the statement of the lemma.
Corollary 3. Suppose E1, E2, . . . are superexpectations. Let ξ : Ω → R be a
bounded function for which E(ξ) = E(ξ). Then, almost surely, E(ξ | ωn) = E(ξ |
ωn)→ ξ(ω) as n→∞.
Proof. By Theorem 2,
lim inf
n→∞ E(ξ | ω
n) ≥ ξ(ω)
for almost all ω ∈ Ω and (applying the theorem to −ξ)
lim sup
n→∞
E(ξ | ωn) ≤ ξ(ω)
for almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Our definitions (8) make it easy to obtain the following corollary for events.
Corollary 4. Suppose E1, E2, . . . are superexpectations. Let E be an event for
which P(E) = P(E). Then, almost surely, P(E | ωn) = P(E | ωn) → IE as
n→∞.
5 An implication for the foundations of game-
theoretic probability theory
Let ξ : Ω → R be a bounded function, and let s := 2. We will obtain an
equivalent definition of the upper expectation E(ξ | s) = E(ξ) if we replace the
phrase “for all ω ∈ Γ(s)” in (6) by “for almost all ω ∈ Ω”. It turns out that
if we do so, the infimum in (6) becomes attained; namely, it is attained by the
supermartingale S(s) := E(ξ | s), s ∈ X ∗. (This fact is the key technical tool
used in [11].) In view of Theorem 2, to prove this statement it suffices to check
that S is indeed a supermartingale (it will be bounded below by Lemma 1). We
will prove a slightly stronger statement.
Lemma 8. Let ξ : Ω→ R. Then S := E(ξ | ·) is a supermartingale.
Proof. Let n ∈ N, s ∈ Xn−1, and r > S(s). By Lemma 4, there exists a bounded
below supermartingale T such that T (s) < r and lim infn T (ωn) ≥ ξ(ω) for all
ω ∈ Ω. Then we have S(sx) ≤ T (sx) for all x ∈ X , and so we have
En(S(s ·)) ≤ En(T (s ·)) ≤ T (s) < r.
Letting r → S(s) (if S(s) <∞) shows that En(S(s ·)) ≤ S(s), which proves the
supermartingale property.
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The following simple example shows that replacing “for all ω ∈ Γ(s)” in (6)
by “for almost all ω ∈ Ω” is essential if we want the infimum to be attained.
Example 2. Consider the coin-tossing protocol, as in Example 1. Let A be the
set of all ω ∈ Ω containing only finitely many 1s, let ξ := IA, and let s := 2.
The infimum in (6) is not attained: there exist no supermartingale S satisfying
S(2) = E(ξ) and lim infn→∞ S(ωn) ≥ ξ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. By Lemma 1, such an S would be positive. Let L be the uniform
probability measure on {0, 1}∞ equipped with the Borel σ-algebra. Since
P(E) = L(E) for all Borel sets in {0, 1}∞ ([9], Proposition 8.5), we would
have S(2) = E(ξ) = 0. A positive supermartingale with initial value 0 in the
coin-tossing protocol must be a constant.
6 More explicit zero-one laws
In this section we will deduce two corollaries from our game-theoretic version of
Le´vy’s zero-one law: Kolmogorov’s zero-one law and the ergodicity of Bernoulli
shifts. Both corollaries were proved in [10] directly. These two results are
more general than the corresponding measure-theoretic results; see [9], Section
8.1, for relations between measure-theoretic results and their game-theoretic
counterparts.
For each N ∈ N, let FN be the set of all events E that are properties of
(ωN , ωN+1, . . .) only (i.e., E such that, for all ω, ω
′ ∈ Ω, ω′ ∈ E whenever ω ∈ E
and ω′n = ωn for all n ≥ N). By a tail event we mean an element of ∩NFN .
In other words, an event E ⊆ Ω is a tail event if any sequence in Ω that agrees
from some point onwards with a sequence in E is also in E.
Kolmogorov’s zero-one law
Le´vy’s zero-one law immediately implies the following game-theoretic version of
Kolmogorov’s zero-one law.
Corollary 5 ([10]). For all tail events E ⊆ Ω, P(E) ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. First we will check that, for each N ∈ N and each E ∈ FN , P(E | s) does
not depend on s ∈ XN−1. Indeed, let s, t ∈ XN−1 and P(E | s) < r. Choose
a bounded below supermartingale S such that S(s) < r and lim infn S(ωn) ≥
IE(ω) for all ω ∈ Γ(s). We will write ab for the concatenation of two situations
a ∈ X ∗ and b ∈ X ∗, and aω for the concatenation of a ∈ X ∗ and ω ∈ Ω. The
supermartingale
S ′(u) :=
{
S(sv) if u = tv for some (uniquely determined) v ∈ X ∗
∞ otherwise
witnesses that P(E | t) < r, in the sense that S ′(t) = S(s) < r and, for all
ω ∈ Ω,
lim inf
n
S ′(tωn) = lim inf
n
S(sωn) ≥ IE(sω) = IE(tω).
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Since this is true for all s, t ∈ XN−1, P(E | s) cannot depend on s ∈ XN−1.
By Lemma 8 and Axiom 4, this implies P(E | ωN−1) = P(E) for N ∈ N,
E ∈ FN , and ω ∈ Ω. By Corollary 2, for E ∈ F we have P(E) = 1 for almost
all ω ∈ E, which is equivalent to P(E) ∈ {0, 1}.
We say that an event E is fully unprobabilized if P(E) = 0 and P(E) = 1.
Since complements of tail events are also tail events, we obtain the following
corollary to Corollary 5.
Corollary 6 ([10]). If E ⊆ Ω is a tail event, then E is almost certain, almost
impossible, or fully unprobabilized.
Ergodicity of Bernoulli shifts
In this subsection we consider a special case of Protocol 1 where E1 = E2 = · · · .
We write θ for the shift operator, which deletes the first element from a sequence
in X∞:
θ : x1x2x3 . . . 7→ x2x3 . . . .
We call an event E ⊆ Ω weakly invariant if θE ⊆ E. In accordance with
standard terminology, an event E is invariant if E = θ−1E.
Lemma 9. An event E is invariant if and only if both E and Ec are weakly
invariant.
Proof. We will give the simple argument from [10]. If E is invariant, then Ec is
also invariant, because the inverse map commutes with complementation. Hence
in this case both E and Ec are weakly invariant.
Conversely suppose that θE ⊆ E and θEc ⊆ Ec. The first inclusion is
equivalent to E ⊆ θ−1E and the second is equivalent to Ec ⊆ θ−1Ec. Since the
right-hand sides of the last two inclusions are disjoint, these inclusions are in
fact equalities.
The following corollary asserts the ergodicity of Bernoulli shifts.
Corollary 7 ([10]). Suppose E1 = E2 = · · · . For all weakly invariant events E,
P(E) ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. For any weakly invariant event E and any situation s, P(E | s) ≤ P(E).
Indeed, let P(E) < r. Choose a bounded below supermartingale S such that
S(2) < r and lim infn S(ωn) ≥ IE(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Define a new bounded
below supermartingale S ′ by S ′(st) := S(t) for all t ∈ X ∗ and S ′(t) := ∞ for
all t ∈ X ∗ such that s 6⊆ t. This supermartingale witnesses that P(E | s) < r,
in the sense that S ′(s) = S(2) < r and
lim inf
n
S ′(sωn) = lim inf
n
S(ωn) ≥ IE(ω) ≥ IE(sω), ∀ω ∈ Ω,
the last inequality following from sω ∈ E ⇒ ω ∈ E.
Therefore, we have P(E | ωn) ≤ P(E) when E is weakly invariant. By
Corollary 2, for almost all ω ∈ E it is true that P(E) = 1. Therefore, P(E) is
either 0 or 1.
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In view of Lemma 9 we obtain the following corollary to Corollary 7.
Corollary 8 ([10]). Suppose E1 = E2 = · · · . If E is an invariant event, then E
is almost certain, almost impossible, or fully unprobabilized.
Since each invariant event is a tail event, Corollary 8 also follows from Corol-
lary 6.
7 The generality of the basic prediction protocol
Let E(X) be the set of all outer probability contents on a set X. Protocol 1 is
a special case of the following apparently more general protocol.
Protocol 2. Prediction protocol with Forecaster
Parameters: non-empty set X , non-empty sets P1,P2, . . .,
and function E : p ∈ ∪nPn 7→ Ep ∈ E(X )
Protocol:
Skeptic announces K0 ∈ R.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Forecaster announces pn ∈ Pn.
Skeptic announces fn such that Epn(fn) ≤ Kn−1.
Reality announces xn ∈ X .
Kn := fn(xn).
END FOR
As compared with Protocol 1, Protocol 2 involves another player, Forecaster;
World is now called Reality. (We will see later that another interpretation is
that World is split into two players: Reality and Forecaster; cf. [9], p. 90.) At the
beginning of each trial Forecaster gives his prediction pn for Reality’s move xn;
the prediction is chosen from a set Pn, the prediction space for trial n. We will
use the notation P for ∪nPn. After Forecaster’s move Skeptic chooses a gamble,
which we represent as a function fn on X : fn(x) is the payoff of the gamble if
Reality chooses x as the trial’s outcome. The gambles available to Skeptic are
determined by Forecaster’s prediction (via the function E : P → E(X )).
Protocol 1 is a special case of Protocol 2 obtained by taking distinct one-
element sets P1,P2, . . . . In some sense Protocol 1 describes independent trials
(since E1, E2, . . . are given in advance) whereas Protocol 2 describes dependent
trials (Forecaster has a say in choosing Ep1 , Ep2 , . . .).
Remark. Another version of the prediction protocol with Forecaster is where
Forecaster chooses the superexpectation functional directly. This is a special
case of our protocol with Pn = E(X ) for all n and with E : P → E(X ) the
identity function. The reader will also notice that allowing E to depend not
only on Forecaster’s last move but also on his and Reality’s previous moves
is straightforward but does not lead to stronger results: the seemingly more
general results easily follow from our results.
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We call the set Ω :=
∏∞
n=1(Pn × X ) of all infinite sequences of Forecaster’s
and Reality’s moves the sample space. The elements of the set
⋃∞
n=0
∏n
i=1(Pi×
X ) of all finite sequences of Forecaster’s and Reality’s moves are called clearing
situations, and the elements of the set
⋃∞
n=0 (
∏n
i=1(Pi ×X )× Pn+1) are called
betting situations. We will be mostly interested in clearing situations. For each
clearing situation s we let Γ(s) ⊆ Ω stand for the set of all infinite extensions
in Ω of s and let 2 be the empty clearing situation.
The level |s| of a clearing situation s is the number of predictions in s. In
other words, n is the level of clearing situations of the form p1x1 . . . pnxn. If
ω ∈ Ω and n ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, ωn is defined to be the unique clearing situation of
level n that is a prefix of ω.
A function S defined on the clearing situations and taking values in R is
called a supermartingale if, for each n ∈ N, each clearing situation s at level
n− 1, and each p ∈ Pn,
Ep(S(sp ·)) ≤ S(s).
For each function ξ : Ω → R and each clearing situation s, we define the
(conditional) upper expectation of ξ given s by the same formula (6), where S
ranges over the supermartingales that are bounded below, and we define the
lower expectation of ξ given s by (7). As before, upper and lower probabilities
of sets are defined by (8).
Lemma 10. Theorem 2 and, therefore, Corollary 2 continue to hold under the
definitions of this section.
Proof. Protocol 2 can be embedded in Protocol 1 as follows. Let the parameters
of Protocol 2 be X , P1,P2, . . ., and E ; as before, P := ∪nPn. For each n ∈ N,
define an outer probability content En on X ′ := P × X by
En(f) := sup
p∈Pn
Ep(f(p, ·)), f : X ′ → R.
(Axioms 1–4 are easy to check for En; e.g., Axiom 3 follows from sup(f + g) ≤
sup f + sup g.) The parameters of Protocol 1 will be X ′ and E1, E2, . . . .
Our goal is to prove (16) in Protocol 2. Let ξ : Ω → (−∞,∞] be bounded
below. To each ω in the sample space Ω of Protocol 2 corresponds the same
sequence in the sample space Ω′ := (X ′)∞ of Protocol 1; therefore, Ω ⊆ Ω′
(perhaps Ω ⊂ Ω′). Let ξ′ : Ω′ → (−∞,∞] be the extension of ξ defined by, say,
ξ′(ω) := 0 for ω /∈ Ω. Since the analogue
lim inf
n→∞ E(ξ
′ | ωn) ≥ ξ′(ω), for almost all ω ∈ Ω′,
of (16) holds in Protocol 1, we are only required to prove two statements:
1. E(ξ | ωn) ≥ E(ξ′ | ωn) for all ω ∈ Ω and n = 0, 1, . . ., where the E on the
left-hand side refers to Protocol 2 and the E on the right-hand side refers
to Protocol 1.
2. If an event E ⊆ Ω′ is null in Protocol 1, E ∩ Ω will be null in Protocol 2.
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First we prove Statement 1. Fix ω ∈ Ω and n ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. For each
 > 0 there is a bounded below supermartingale S in Protocol 2 such that
S(ωn) ≤ E(ξ | ωn) +  and lim infn→∞ S(ωnψ) ≥ ξ(ωnψ) for all ψ ∈ Ω. Let
S ′ be the extension of S to (X ′)∗ defined as ∞ on the situations in Protocol 1
that are not clearing situations in Protocol 2. By the definition of En, S ′ will be
a supermartingale in Protocol 1: if s is a clearing situation in Protocol 2 (the
case where it is not is trivial), we have
En(S(s ·)) = sup
p∈Pn
Ep(S(sp ·)) ≤ sup
p∈Pn
S(s) = S(s),
where n = |s| + 1. The supermartingale S ′ witnesses that E(ξ′ | ωn) ≤ E(ξ |
ωn) + : indeed, we have lim infm→∞ S ′(ωnψm) = lim infm→∞ S(ωnψm) ≥
ξ(ωnψ) = ξ′(ωnψ) for ψ ∈ Ω since S ′ is an extension of S and ξ′ is an extension
of ξ, and we have lim infm→∞ S ′(ωnψm) = ∞ ≥ 0 = ξ′(ωnψ) for ψ ∈ Ω′ \ Ω
since in this case ωnψm is not a clearing situation in Protocol 2 from some m
on. Setting → 0 completes the proof of Statement 1.
To prove Statement 2, it suffices to check that for any supermartingale S ′
in Protocol 1 its restriction to the clearing situations in Protocol 2 will be a
supermartingale in Protocol 2. This follows immediately from the definition of
E1, E2, . . .: if n ∈ N, s is a clearing situation at level n− 1, and p ∈ Pn,
Ep (S ′(sp ·)) ≤ sup
p∈Pn
Ep (S ′(sp ·)) = En (S ′(s ·)) ≤ S ′(s)
(the first two · stand for an element of X and the last · stands for an element
of X ′).
Notice that Theorem 2 is a special case of Lemma 10, corresponding to
distinct one-element sets P1,P2, . . . in Protocol 2. The argument in the proof
of Lemma 10 (which is due to a referee) demonstrates that Protocols 1 and 2
are essentially equivalent.
8 Ba´rtfai and Re´ve´sz’s zero-one law
In this section we will illustrate Le´vy’s zero-one law by deducing a simple game-
theoretic analogue of a zero-one law [2] for dependent random variables. Intu-
itively, the role of the sample space will now be played by the set X∞ of all
moves by Reality, and the role of situations will be played by elements of X ∗.
If χ = x1x2 . . . ∈ X∞, we let χn stand for xn ∈ X for n ∈ N, and let χn stand
for x1 . . . xn ∈ Xn for n ∈ {0, 1, . . .}.
A forecasting system Φ is any function Φ : X ∗ → P such that Φ(χn−1) ∈ Pn
for all χ ∈ X∞ and n ∈ N. A forecasting system can serve as a strategy for
Forecaster in Protocol 2, giving Forecaster’s move as function of Reality’s moves.
For each χ ∈ X∞ define
χΦ := Φ(2)χ1Φ(χ
1)χ2Φ(χ
2)χ3 . . . ∈ Ω.
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For each E ⊆ X∞ define EΦ := {χΦ | χ ∈ E}. For E ⊆ X∞, χ ∈ X∞, and
n ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, set
PΦ(E | χn) := P(EΦ | (χΦ)n), PΦ(E | χn) := 1− PΦ(Ec | χn).
As before, “ | 2” may be omitted, so that PΦ(E) = P(EΦ) and PΦ(E) = P(EΦ).
An E ⊆ X∞ holds Φ-almost surely (Φ-a.s.) if PΦ(Ec) = 0.
For each N ∈ N, let FN be the set of all E ⊆ X∞ such that, for all χ, χ′ ∈ Ω,
(χ ∈ E,∀n ≥ N : χ′n = χn) =⇒ χ′ ∈ E.
Let us say that a forecasting system Φ is δ-mixing, for δ ∈ [0, 1), if there exists
a function a : N→ N such that
PΦ(E | χn)− PΦ(E) ≤ δ Φ-a.s. (21)
for each n ∈ N and each E ∈ Fn+a(n). By a tail set we mean an element
of ∩NFN . Now we can state an approximate zero-one law, which is a game-
theoretic analogue of the main result of [2].
Corollary 9. Suppose Ep is a superexpectation for all p ∈ P. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and
let Φ be a δ-mixing forecasting system. If E ⊆ X∞ is a tail set, then PΦ(E) = 0
or PΦ(E) ≥ 1− δ.
Proof. Fix a tail set E ⊆ X∞; (21) then holds for all n. By the last part
of Lemma 5 (which is also valid in Protocol 2), there is A ⊆ X∞ such that
PΦ(A) = 0 and
PΦ(E | χn)− PΦ(E) ≤ δ (22)
holds for all n and all χ /∈ A. By definition, (22) means
P(EΦ | (χΦ)n)− P(EΦ) ≤ δ. (23)
By Corollary 2 and Lemma 10, there is a set B ⊆ Ω such that P(B) = 0 and
P(EΦ | ωn)→ 1 (n→∞) (24)
for all ω ∈ EΦ \ B. Letting n → ∞ in (23) and using (24), we can see that
P(EΦ) ≥ 1 − δ (i.e., PΦ(E) ≥ 1 − δ) for all χ such that χ /∈ A (i.e., χΦ /∈ AΦ)
and χΦ ∈ EΦ \B.
Suppose PΦ(E) ≥ 1− δ is violated. Then there are no χ satisfying χΦ /∈ AΦ
and χΦ ∈ EΦ \ B. In other words, EΦ \ B ⊆ AΦ, which implies EΦ ⊆ AΦ ∪ B,
which in turn implies P(EΦ) = 0, i.e., PΦ(E) = 0.
Let us say that a set E ⊆ X∞ is Φ-unprobabilized if PΦ(E) < PΦ(E). An
important special case of Corollary 9 is the following zero-one law for “weakly
dependent” trials (cf. Corollary 1 in [2]).
Corollary 10. Suppose Ep is a superexpectation for all p ∈ P. Let δ ∈ [0, 1/2)
and let Φ be a δ-mixing forecasting system. Every tail set E ⊆ X∞ satisfies
PΦ(E) = 1, satisfies PΦ(E) = 0, or is Φ-unprobabilized.
24
Proof. It suffices to apply Corollary 9 to the tail sets E and Ec.
It is easy to strengthen Corollary 9 by modifying the notion of a δ-mixing
forecasting system. Let us say that the forecasting system is asymptotically δ-
mixing, for δ ∈ [0, 1), if (21) holds for each n ∈ N and each tail set E. Ba´rtfai and
Re´ve´sz [2] do not introduce this notion (more precisely, its measure-theoretic
version) explicitly, but they do introduce two notions intermediate between
δ-mixing and asymptotic δ-mixing, which they call stochastic δ-mixing and δ-
mixing in mean. The following proposition is similar to (but much simpler than)
Theorems 2 and 3 in [2].
Corollary 11. Suppose Ep is a superexpectation for all p ∈ P. Let δ ∈ [0, 1).
The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. A forecasting system Φ is asymptotically δ-mixing.
2. Every tail set E ⊆ X∞ satisfies PΦ(E) = 0 or PΦ(E) ≥ 1− δ.
Proof. The argument of Corollary 9 shows that the first condition implies the
second. Let us now assume the second condition and deduce the first. Let n ∈ N
and E be a tail set. If PΦ(E) = 0, then PΦ(E | χn) = 0 Φ-a.s. can be proved
similarly to the proof of Lemma 7, and so (21) holds. If PΦ(E) ≥ 1− δ, (21) is
vacuous.
Acknowledgements
Our thinking about Le´vy’s zero-one law was influenced by a preliminary draft of
[3]. We are grateful to Gert de Cooman for his questions that inspired some of
the results in Section 3 of this article, and to an anonymous referee of [10] who
pointed out to us the zero-one law in [2].This article has benefitted very much
from a close reading by its anonymous referee, whose penetrating comments have
led to a greatly improved presentation (in particular, Lemmas 1, 2, 4, 5 and the
final statements of Theorem 2 and Lemma 8 are due to him or her) and helped
us correct a vacuous statement in a previous version. Andrzej Ruszczyn´ski has
brought to our attention the literature on coherent measures of risk. Our work
has been supported in part by EPSRC grant EP/F002998/1.
References
[1] Philippe Artzner, Freddy Delbaen, Jean-Marc Eber, and David Heath. Co-
herent measures of risk. Mathematical Finance, 9:203–228, 1999.
[2] Pa´l Ba´rtfai and Pa´l Re´ve´sz. On a zero-one law. Zeitschrift fu¨r Wahrschein-
lichkeitstheorie und verwandte Gebiete, 7:43–47, 1967.
[3] Bernard Bru and Salah Eid. Jessen’s theorem and Le´vy’s lemma: A cor-
respondence. Electronic Journal for History of Probability and Statistics,
5(1), June 2009. Available on-line at http://www.jehps.net/.
25
[4] Isaac P. Cornfeld, Sergei V. Fomin, and Yakov G. Sinai. Ergodic Theory.
Springer, New York, 1982.
[5] Gert de Cooman and Filip Hermans. Imprecise probability trees: bridging
two theories of imprecise probability. Artificial Intelligence, 172:1400–1427,
2008.
[6] Jørgen Hoffmann-Jørgensen. The general marginal problem. In Sve-
tozar Kurepa, Hrvoje Kraljevic´, and Davor Butkovic´, editors, Functional
Analysis II, volume 1242 of Lecture Notes in Mathematics, pages 77–367.
Springer, Berlin, 1987.
[7] Andrei N. Kolmogorov. Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung.
Springer, Berlin, 1933. English translation: Foundations of the Theory of
Probability. Chelsea, New York, 1950.
[8] Paul Le´vy. The´orie de l’addition des variables ale´atoires. Gauthier-Villars,
Paris, 1937. Second edition: 1954.
[9] Glenn Shafer and Vladimir Vovk. Probability and Finance: It’s Only a
Game! Wiley, New York, 2001.
[10] Akimichi Takemura, Vladimir Vovk, and Glenn Shafer. The generality of
the zero-one laws. Accepted for publication and published on-line in Annals
of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics. Available as arXiv technical
report arXiv:0803.3679 [math.PR], 2009.
[11] Vladimir Vovk and Alexander Shen. Prequential randomness and proba-
bility. Theoretical Computer Science, 411:2632–2646, 2010.
[12] Peter Whittle. Probability via Expectation. Springer, New York, fourth
edition, 2000.
26
